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S I M E E N  M A H M U D
The failure of garment workers in Bangladesh to mobilize for their rights 
as workers and citizens in spite of the intense publicity generated by 
international campaigns, as well as the unusual visibility of the country’s 
large female workforce, remains poorly understood.1 
The ‘resource mobilization’ theory of social movement is premised on 
the existence of the rational ‘active citizen’ who would overcome the di-
lemma of participation and be motivated to become involved in collective 
struggle from self-interest if there were ‘selective incentives’ (rewards) and 
a collectivity of social relations and social life with a strong organizational 
base (Oberschall 1973; Olsen 1965). On the other hand, the ‘political 
process’ approach to analysing collective action explains mobilization 
primarily in relation to the external political and institutional context (the 
state), so that movements vary in their strategy, structure and outcomes 
under different political contexts (Tilly 1978; Tarrow 1998). Explanations 
of collective struggles and mobilizations have also been posed in terms of 
how the collective action is ‘framed’ or, in other words, how participants 
are convinced that their cause is just and important (Tarrow 1998).
While the above frameworks may provide an entry point for exploring 
mobilization or its absence in countries of the South such as Bangladesh, 
they cannot capture the entirety of the dynamics behind the political 
behaviour of citizens in these contexts, for instance the unwillingness 
of garment workers in Bangladesh to organize and mobilize in order to 
challenge the structure and the power base. 
In Bangladesh research and policy attention on workers’ rights and 
labour relations in the private sector and the informal economy have been 
scarce; most of the attention has been on labour relations in the formal 
economy and on public sector workers (Mondal 2002; Khan 2001). The 
development of informal labour relations within a formal production 
process is unique to export garment manufacturing and presents bar-
riers to workers’ mobilization and other accountability processes that 
are usually relied upon to safeguard labour rights in the formal sector. 
This uniqueness of the labour contract reduces the relevance of much 
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of the existing theory on social mobilization in explaining the inability 
of garment workers to mobilize.
This chapter seeks to address the empirical question posed in the 
title from the perspective of garment workers themselves and other 
 actors in the process. The analysis draws upon in-depth interviews with 
twenty garment workers and interviews with officials of the Department 
of Labour, officers of the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Ex-
porters Association (BGMEA) and staff of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (the Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust and Ain o Salish 
Kendra) that provide rights awareness and legal aid to garment workers, 
employers and factory managers. There were visits to garment factories 
in Dhaka and in the export processing zone (EPZ). The chapter also relies 
upon information collected from a survey of garment workers in 2002 
in Dhaka and media reports, especially regarding worker struggles and 
mobilization, because the workers involved could not be found. (Many 
had returned to their village homes or had to move out to other areas 
and other jobs.)
The chapter is arranged as follows. The first section elaborates the 
institutional context for mobilization. The next section discusses the 
unique labour contract in export garment manufacturing. The two sec-
tions following discuss the role of workers’ associations in garment 
workers’ struggles for rights and describe the different types of protests 
that have evolved over time. The section after that assesses their cost 
for garment workers. In the final section the chapter tries to draw some 
conclusions.
The institutional context and political opportunity structures
Labour legislation in Bangladesh harks back to British times and much 
of it is obsolete and outdated.2 After partition in 1947 some of these laws 
were adapted and twenty-five new laws were passed. Since independence 
from Pakistan in 1971, thirteen more labour laws have been promulgated 
(Mondal 2002). In manufacturing and industry, labour relations are cur-
rently governed by the Factories Act of 1965 and the Factories Rules of 
1979, both of which are designed to protect labour and provide for safe 
and hygienic workplace conditions in fairly large factory situations. In 
other words, existing labour legislation and provisions primarily protect 
skilled and semi-skilled adult male workers who are represented by  unions 
and collective bargaining associations, which in Bangladesh means the 
so-called privileged working class: mainly the urban, male workforce 
employed by the public sector and a tiny formal private sector found in 
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financial services and larger-scale manufacturing. Labour legislation in 
Bangladesh not only excludes the majority of workers in Bangladesh; it 
also fails to protect those it does formally include.
Existing labour legislation is therefore inadequate to meet the require-
ments and challenges of a liberalizing economy that aspires to compete 
in a globalizing world using flexible and almost unregulated labour rela-
tions. In addition, since existing labour legislation assumes a predom-
inantly male workforce, it is often at a loss to deal with the specific needs 
and concerns of the overwhelmingly female and unskilled workforce 
employed in garment manufacturing. This is even more critical in the 
export garment sector, where a highly flexible and fragmented produc-
tion process exposes workers to new vulnerabilities in a new economic 
order that can limit even the autonomy of state action within national 
boundaries.
The blind eye of the state The Bangladesh government, both constitution-
ally and as signatory to various international conventions, is committed 
to protecting the rights of workers and ensuring non-exploitative and 
decent workplace conditions for all workers, whether in the formal or 
informal sector. Workers in Bangladesh, however, ranging from those 
in agriculture and in low-productivity cottage industries to those in non-
traded service activities in the non-formal sectors, and even to garment 
factory workers, are exposed to exploitation and the violation of rights 
and remain unprotected by formal accountability processes. In this 
general context workers’ rights in the export garment manufacturing 
sector have received relatively more attention internationally because the 
outsourcing of production processes has brought workers in the poorer 
countries of the South into direct competition with workers in the richer 
Northern countries and made the rights and standards that prevail in 
Southern countries of direct consequence to workers and consumers 
in the North (Mahmud and Kabeer 2007).
Although theoretically all workers in Bangladesh are supposed to be 
protected under existing labour legislation (in terms of the constitution), 
only a negligible fraction actually enjoy the protection of the state. For 
example, while the constitution of Bangladesh guarantees that the state 
will ‘emancipate the toiling masses … from all sorts of exploitation’, the 
proportion of total workers protected by the existing legal framework is 
less than 3 per cent (Mondal 2002: 121). Although this legal framework 
provides for the fundamental right of all workers to freedom of associ-
ation and collective bargaining, in reality the state is not able to ensure 
